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BGP Blackholing

BGP Blackholing

TurkIX BGP Blackholing gives public peering participants a fast way to signal attacked prefixes over their existing route server sessions and have matching traffic discarded inside the TurkIX fabric. It is designed for live DDoS response, keeping mitigation targeted to the affected destination while preserving capacity for the rest of the network.

65535:666 required BGP community
/25 - /32 accepted IPv4 prefixes
/49 - /128 accepted IPv6 prefixes
01 Rapid operator action

Signal the attacked host or subnet with a standard BGP community and let TurkIX enforce the drop inside the exchange.

02 Tightly scoped mitigation

The blackhole applies only to the attacked destination and only for the member requesting protection, helping preserve unaffected services.

03 Safe for the wider fabric

Because the routes are not redistributed, other members do not receive extra blackhole prefixes or unexpected routing changes.

A direct control plane for urgent traffic suppression

Members announce the attacked host or subnet as a more-specific prefix tagged with the TurkIX blackhole community. If the prefix length matches policy, TurkIX suppresses matching traffic inside the exchange before it reaches the congested member-facing edge.

  • Supports IPv4 and IPv6 more-specific announcements within policy
  • Mitigation still works even when traffic sources peer bilaterally rather than through route servers
  • Helps relieve overload during large-scale DDoS events

Required community and accepted prefix lengths

To activate BGP Blackholing, tag the attacked prefix with the TurkIX blackhole community and announce it through an existing route server session. Announcements outside the accepted ranges are ignored.

  • BGP community 65535:666
  • IPv4 policy /25 to /32

    Use the narrowest attacked host or subnet that fits inside the accepted IPv4 more-specific range.

  • IPv6 policy /49 to /128

    Announce the impacted IPv6 destination within the allowed range for blackhole signaling.

A single announcement to either TurkIX route server is enough for activation.

A clean operator runbook for live incidents

A typical BGP Blackholing workflow at TurkIX follows a short, predictable sequence during an attack event.

01 Identify the attacked destination

Confirm the impacted host or subnet and choose the narrowest more-specific prefix allowed by policy.

02 Announce the blackhole route

Tag the selected prefix with community 65535:666 and announce it to an existing TurkIX route server session.

03 TurkIX suppresses matching traffic

Matching packets are discarded inside the exchange fabric before they continue toward the affected member-facing edge.

04 Withdraw when mitigation is no longer needed

Remove the announcement after the event so normal traffic to the destination resumes through the standard routing path.

Scope Public peering traffic only

Blackholing is applied inside the TurkIX public peering environment and is not intended to interfere with private service delivery.

Distribution No route redistribution

Other members do not receive blackhole announcements, which keeps their routing tables unchanged and avoids extra prefix pressure.

Isolation Port-scoped enforcement

The drop is enforced toward the announcing member's port(s), keeping the action isolated even if a request is made in error.

Operations Fits incident response workflows

Operators can activate the signal during an event and withdraw it when the attack subsides, using their existing BGP operations model.

Plan your TurkIX blackholing workflow before the next incident

If your network plans to use BGP Blackholing, our team can help you validate prerequisites, align route server policy, and prepare an incident response workflow that is ready when needed.

Company

TurkIX Communications Ltd
Str. Han Kubrat 1, floor 3 office 306, 4000 Plovdiv, Bulgaria

NOC & Sales

24/7 NOC — noc@turkix.bg
Sales — sales@turkix.bg
+359 877 75 5924

PoPs

63 Shipchenski prohod Blvd. 1574 Sofia, Bulgaria